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INTRODUCTION
Evidence of mergers, acquisitions, and strategic partnerships of firms special-
izing in biotechnology and the related product chain is widespread. Popular
examples include the DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred International strategic part-
nership and acquisition; the purchase of Dekalb Genetics Corporation by
Monsanto; the failed acquisition of Monsanto by American Home Products; the
purchase of Holden Seeds by Monsanto; the consolidation of U.S. and European
companies forming Norvatis; the consolidation of cooperatives and private
firms specializing in grain and oil seed handling; and many others (Lerner and
Merges 1997). The upshot of these mergers, acquisitions, and strategic partner-
ships is that there are currently many fewer major companies controlling most
of the genetics and related developmental systems for supporting biotechnology
advances in the production of major staple crops, and the processing and
delivery systems for taking advantage of related traits.
What is causing the consolidation in the biotechnology industry? Many of
the explanations are peculiar to the firms involved and their special circum-
stances. In this paper we focus on the economic aspects of these firms, and the
conditions under which they operate. In addition, we emphasize the technology
and policy factors responsible for consolidation. In the case of technology, there
are many angles for investigation. For instance, aspects of technology that relate
to the special and complex features of research and development for biotechnol-
ogy products, the technology of organizations and our improved knowledge
about contracts and incentive compatibility, the growth and evolution of
information technology and its impacts on the development of integrated
assembly, handling and processing systems for biotechnology/derived products,
the scale and scope economies that emerge from various sources, and
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technologies supporting marketing systems that can capture the values of
special traits of products.
Policy factors that are important in determining patterns of consolidation and
integration are equally important compared to technology. These include: Food
safety and product integrity; anti-monopoly and related measures to control
competition; the more open-trading environment and associated expansion of
markets for firms specializing in biotechnology; innovations in equity markets
that provide access to lower cost risk capital for supporting mergers and
acquisitions; restrictions on information-sharing associated with expanded
opportunities for licensing and patenting; the changing roles of the public
and private sectors in carrying out societal responsibilities for research and
development; and the pressures resulting in shorter product cycles for
biotechnology products. These are among the factors that provide increased
incentives for firm integration and expansion.
We will show that at the root of many of these policy and technological
factors that have been identified as influencing industry consolidation are the
pervasive concepts of asset specificity, incomplete contracts, and residual
property rights. Our understanding of these and related concepts has rapidly
expanded during the past two decades (Hart 1991; Grossman and Hart 1986;
Aghion and Tirole 1994). These results have complemented the earlier work on
transactions costs and industry structure (Williamson 1985; Klein, Crawford
and Alchian 1978). Combined with game theoretic formulations for character-
izing strategic behavior, these developments provide plausible and instructive
explanations for how firms responding to the changing policy and technological
factors like those described above are motivated to form strategic partnerships,
make acquisitions, and merge. The actions lead to consolidation patterns
consistent with those observed in the industry developing and bringing to
the market products made possible by advances in biotechnology.
SOURCES OF VALUE AND INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
A key factor in understanding industry consolidation is the idea of value-added.
Specifically, firms considering strategic partnerships, mergers, and acquisitions
are motivated to act by increased profits. In order for profits to increase, some
kind of value must result from the consolidation. It is instructive to identify the
sources of potential value as a basis for better understanding the incentives for
and patterns of industry consolidation. For purposes of exposition, we classify
these sources as organizational, strategic complementarities, strategic
substitutes, and market power (Melkonian and Johnson 1999a; Vickers and
Waterson 1991).
Organizational sources of value relate in general to the things that firms can
do together more efficiently than they can do on their own. Examples of
organizational sources of value include coordinated purchases of inputs, shared
information on production and other technologies, cooperation in assembly
and handling functions, marketing, and what we will term “investment
externalities.” In the latter case we refer to a situation in which firms acting
together can benefit from “public good” type joint investments. For instance,
biotechnology firms may find it convenient to cooperate in meeting food
security and other regulations, jointly managing information on production
patterns and product traits, or in risk management, e.g. self-insurance. These
value sources are important because they are relatively easily defined and
obtained, if the firms are prepared to cooperate “faithfully.”
Strategic complementarities (first set out by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and
Klemperer 1985) relate to efficiencies that can be achieved by coordinated
investment and other activities. We take investment as the example. One firm
may invest in specialized genetics while another may invest in chemical
pesticides that result in reduced production costs, given success with the
genetics. Processing firms may use agents that result in product traits that have
special market values. If firms cooperate, again faithfully, value emerges from
coordinated investment or product development strategies. In short, the firms
cooperating in their decisions on investment can generate more value than if
they proceed independently. Given the high research and development costs for
biotechnology, the value generated by strategic complementarities can drive
various forms of consolidation.
A strategic substitute (Melkonian and Johnson 1999a) is a concept referring
to the converse of strategic complements. In this case, we can think of firms
that are competitors in a limited market. Investments to expand output by one
firm have the effect of driving down the price for both firms. Again, faithful
cooperation among the firms can result in increased value and profit. These
kinds of strategic substitutes are particularly important in the biotechnology
industry. This is an industry with the capacity to produce products that have
highly specialized markets, e.g. nutraceuticals, oils containing only particular
types of fats, resistance to local pests, etc. In these segmented market situations,
actions of one firm have important implications for the profitability of the
competitors, and the industry.
Market power and it implications for profitability is well known from the
traditional economic literature. Still, market power provides strong incentives
for consolidation, whether to limit strategic substitutes, to manage product
development cycles, to control pricing and inventory levels, or simply to drive
out the competitors and prevent entry. In the biotechnology industry the
complexities of product development, product registration and licensing, and
the sharing of discoveries and patents provide opportunities for cooperation to
improve market power. Firms have incentives to coordinate in meeting
protocols for providing market access and for reducing the risks of sharing
licenses and patents.
Of course, the regulatory environment in which the biotechnology and other
industries operate may limit the opportunities for engaging in activities to
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generate values from these sources. From a societal viewpoint, there are
potential costs associated with industry consolidation designed to exploit
these value sources. At the same time, allowing firms to coordinate to achieve
these improvements in value puts at their disposal increased capital for
investments in new technologies and products. National and international
regulatory systems are implicitly balancing the benefits of consolidation with
its cost. In the US, it would appear that the current environment tends to favor
consolidations and transfers from consumers to producers that are rationalized
on the basis of their implications for increased investment and more rapid rates
of product development and technical change.
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND RESIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Given the value that can be generated by various forms of coordination simply
by contracting, why is there a trend toward concentration? In an ideal world
firms would recognize the value of coordination, develop the associated
contracts to assure that it occurs, and gain the related value — without mergers,
acquisitions, or strategic partnerships. Of course, there are legal constraints to
these kinds of contracts due to the regulatory environment and national or
international anti-monopoly policies. Still, it would appear that in the
biotechnology industry the decision has been not to coordinate through
specialized contracts, but to exchange ownership rights as a basis for
cooperation.
One of the reasons for this tendency in the biotechnology industry is the
difficulty in specifying and enforcing contracts. In reality when firms try to
coordinate, the contracts that they write are incomplete. Simply put, they fail
to anticipate all of the important contingencies and/or the specifics are not
enforceable. In turn, the fact that firms understand these problems leads them
to make non-optimal relationship-specific investments. Second-best solutions
to coordination problems emerge as optimal strategies for firms that could
benefit from fuller cooperation, if contracts are incomplete. Moreover, the
residual property rights (those not anticipated in the terms of the contract)
go to the owner. In the biotechnology industry where there are long lead times
on investments and highly uncertain outcomes, contracts that cover all of the
important contingencies are very difficult to specify.
Firms facing these contracting problems have a number of alternatives. First,
they can proceed independently. This strategy results in foregoing the value
that could be generated by coordination. Second, they can coordinate using
incomplete contracts. This results in under investment and potential litigation
and other costs associated with claims on residual property rights. Third, the
firms can engage in partnerships that involve exchanges of assets, a mechanism
that mitigates the problems of ill-specified contracts. These strategic partner-
ships are organizational mechanisms that provide compatible incentives for the
cooperating firms. In this circumstance, less attention to the details of contracts
governing coordination initiatives and their enforcement is necessary. By virtue
of the fact that the firms have shared ownership, they mutually benefit from
successes of the cooperative ventures and quite importantly, have the incentives
to make individual investments that are consistent with success. Shirking and
free-riding problems are greatly reduced.
The situation with incomplete contracts becomes even more complicated
when it is recognized that they may include components with different levels
of enforceability. In this case, the parties to the contracts are likely to focus on
the fulfillment of the components that are more enforceable and to under invest
in the components where enforceability is more uncertain (Bernheim and
Whinston 1998). At least two problems emerge from this characteristic of
contracts. First, the components of the contracts are not independent in terms
of the desired outcome. Thus, under investment in the components of the
contract that is less enforceable can have significant impact on the success of
the joint venture. Second, the parties to the contract may have beliefs about the
success of the joint venture based on different perceptions of the fulfillment of
the different components of the contract. Again, investment behavior that is
influenced by enforceability will be the case. The role of the dominant party in
obtaining the residual property rights when viewed in this context makes the
outcome even less predictable.
The firms that are entering into the contracts also may have differences in
the scope of their product lines. For example, one firm with a large portfolio of
biotechnology products may contract with another firm that has a much more
limited product line. If there are complementarities among the product lines,
investment strategies will be affected. For example, strong complementarities
for the firm with more product lines could induce it to invest more than would
be rational given the incomplete contract considered in isolation. Thus, there
is a “portfolio” effect that determines optimal investments for incomplete
contracts. Independent consideration of the contracts, even with the benefit of
the most advanced concepts, could result in inconsistencies between predicted
and observed behavior. Alternatively, the firm with the narrow product line
could be involved in a number of incomplete contacts with different firms.
Here again the portfolio contracts, somewhat like a situation with larger scope
multi-product firms, will influence investment patterns, and the way that the
firm negotiates and executes particular contracts. All this means that the simple
application of results from incomplete contracts and residual property right
must be highly specialized to the partnering firms, if outcomes are to be
predictable.
The problems of contracts with components that have different enforceability
and the portfolio effects observed for multi-product firms or firms dealing
with multiple partners, can be argued to suggest benefits of relatively simple
contracts. The more complex the contract, the more components. The greater
the scope for the portfolio of products, the more opportunity for complemen-
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tarities that are not covered by product specific products. The more firms
with which a representative firm has contracts, the greater the possibility for
opportunistic strategies. Particularly in dynamic contexts, complexities of this
type have been argued to imply benefits of leaving some contractible contin-
gencies “ambiguous” (Bernheim and Whinston 1998).
MERGER OR ACQUISITION VERSUS STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
One of the important factors affecting decisions for mergers or acquisitions
compared to the development of strategic partnerships (shared partial
ownership) is the impact of management on the valuation of the firm. It is
instructive to think of the valuation of the firm as consisting of two compo-
nents. One component is management specific, identified with a very capable
entrepreneur. The second component is transferable with acquisition, for
example patents and licenses, physical assets, etc. Thus, firm decisions on joint
ventures must be governed by the complexities of contracting and shared
ownership and by strategies designed to capture the benefits of the management
component of firm valuation. In the biotechnology industry where many start-
up firms are identified with many gifted managers or scientists, this is an issue
of particular relevance for consolidation and ownership patterns.
Suppose one firm acquires another. If the firm that is acquired has a high
management component, then the acquisition package will have to include
incentives for the manager. If the acquisition package does not include these
incentives the manager will leave or behave in a way that reduces the per-
formance of the acquired firm. For these reasons, it is not always clear that
the solution to incomplete contracting problems associated with multi-firm
ventures is acquisition or a merger. Instead, there may be reasons to use
strategic partnership in combination with simpler contracts. This assures
the retention of the benefits of the management components of the two firms
and sufficient incentive compatibility that the unanticipated contract contin-
gencies or relatively less enforceable features of the contracts will be honored in
a way that contributes to the benefit of the firms (and managers).
An unanswered question for strategic partnerships is the optimal ownership
share. Simply put, if two firms enter into a joint venture that is covered by an
incomplete contract, what is the appropriate exchange of ownership to assure
that both the firms and the managers have appropriate incentives to invest to
fulfill the contract. In fact, there are two related questions. One is optimal
investment for each of the firms. A second is the optimal level of ownership
exchange to provide the incentives for the managers of the two firms to make
the optimal investments (Melkonian and Johnson 1999a). Even from this
simple characterization of the joint venture problem, it is apparent that the
shares of ownership required to generate incentives for optimal investment will
depend on the contributions of the management and transferable components
of the value of the firm. The higher the share of the transferable component the
greater the incentive for merger or acquisition as a way of dealing with
problems of incomplete contracts and the disposition of residual property
rights.
In a dynamic setting there is the possibility that a strategic partnership can
provide an opportunity for learning. In this case, a firm that is well managed
may form a partnership with another firm and during the dynamic process
acquire the specialized management knowledge of the second firm. Thus,
strategic partnerships can be used as a pre-acquisition tactic. Of course, if this
is a tactic for acquisition then the investment strategy and the ownership for
the strategic partnership are affected. The firm intending to use the strategic
partnership, as a tactic for acquisition, may be willing to enter into an exchange
of ownership which viewed in the short run as non-optimal. The capacity
of one firm to learn from another may also be related to the ability of the
management to handle diverse enterprises. For example, other things equal,
multi-product firms may find it less costly to acquire the management skills
of their strategic partners.
These decisions on strategic partnerships, mergers, and acquisitions are
clearly dependent on nature of technology and a policy environment. Different
strategies can be anticipated if, for example, the joint venture involves the
development of a product for which the technology is highly uncertain,
compared to the situation where the technology is standard. Policy is also
important in governing these strategies. For example, threats of intervention
by government to reduce monopoly power may limit plans for acquisition.
Expansions of patent and licensing opportunities may reduce the contribution
of the management component, increasing the transferable component and
providing incentives for more rapid merger or acquisition. These outcomes
illustrate the factors contributing to consolidation in the biotechnology
industry.
SPECIAL FEATURES FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
The observed rapid concentration in the biotechnology and related sectors can
be viewed in part a result of problems related to incomplete contracts. Many
biotechnology products are produced in highly integrated systems. These
highly integrated systems may be required to assure expression of the trait that
is adding value, meaning that firms along the product chain have incentives
to cooperate. Experiences with the complexities of contracting appear to have
led to partnerships that generate compatible incentives, and ultimately to
consolidation.
Critical factors have already been identified. They include the complexity of
the contracts, the uncertainties associated with technologies being used to
execute the contracts, and the incentives for non-optimal behavior. These are
fairly standard results from the available literature on incomplete contracts.
What we have added are critical factors that appear special to the biotechnology
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industry. Examples include the importance of understanding the management
and transferable components of firm value, strategic partnerships as acquisition
tactics, the implications of differential enforceability for provisions of contracts,
and what we have termed “portfolio effects related to multiple contracts of a
single firm or single contracts for multi-product firms.”
There is significant public participation in the biotechnology industry. In
terms of agricultural research and development, public universities and research
enterprises invest almost as much as the private-sector. This feature of the
societal investment strategy appears to generate a continuing number of small
and specialized firms. These firms are often participants in strategic partner-
ships with the larger firms, and ultimately are acquired. The public sector is in
some sense providing innovation to a consolidated industry. The result may be
a reduction in the implications of the observed concentration for innovation
and product development. Public sector investments are in fact providing the
source of this innovation and change. One could argue that in such circum-
stances the consolidation and concentration effects are being at least partially
mitigated by the large role of the public sector in research and development
investments.
The implication is then for increased consolidation, less limited by policy
interventions and less damaging in terms of effects of concentration. Reduc-
tions in the share of public sector in research and development could
significantly alter this situation, however. With high public investments there
are always threats of entry and sources of new innovation. Perhaps this is one
of the unanticipated benefits of the public role in research and development
in sectors where contracting and other problems provide strong incentives for
consolidation.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In fact, there is an “industry policy” for the biotechnology sector. A major
instrument for this industry policy is the large public investment in research
and development. A second instrument that is of importance is the expanded
scope for patents and licensing. Anti-monopoly policy is also exercised.
However, it is not clear that this industry policy is reflective of the special
circumstances in the biotechnology sector. Our conclusion is that there will
continue to be strong incentives for consolidation. Moreover, these forces
are largely driven by advantages of integration and associated contracting
problems. At least one of the implications is for better understanding of public
research and development as a key component in the strategy for “managing”
the sector.
We have not yet raised the question of the implications of consolidation for
developed versus developing nations. In fact, implicitly, the discussion and
observations have been within the context of the industry, as we understand it
in the U.S., or more generally the developed nations. If public research and
development expenditures are important in counterbalancing the consolidation
in the biotechnology sector, there are implications for the developing nations.
These nations have relatively low public investments. Impacts of consolidation
in the industry could be more pervasive and/or require the use of other
instruments for managing the effects of consolidation and concentration.
The opportunities for better understanding the incentives for mergers and
acquisitions and, more generally, for industry consolidation, are being greatly
enhanced by our increased understanding of asset specificity’s, incomplete
contacts, and residual property rights. We have tried to add to this understand-
ing by investigating more carefully the features of the contracts, the role of
management, and the complexities introduced when it is recognized that firms
tend to have multiple contracts and multiple products.
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